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Ini Surat Sutradara 'Jagal' Soal Capres Indonesia 

http://pemilu.tempo.co/read/news/2014/06/27/269588510/Ini-Surat-Sutradara-Jagal-Soal-Capres-Indonesia

TEMPO.CO, Jakarta - Sutradara film Jagal (The Act of Killing) meraih nominasi film dokumenter terbaik Oscar, Joshua Oppenheimer menorehkan perhatiannya pada pemilihan presiden Indonesia dengan membuat surat terbuka kepada masyarakat Indonesia. Surat terbuka itu juga di-posting di laman Facebook milik Joshua, Jumat, 27 Juni 2014.

"Saya setuju dan bangga pernyataan saya 'Mengapa Saya Peduli dengan Pemilihan Presiden Indonesia' diterbitkan," kata Joshua kepada Tempo, Jumat sore, 27 Juni 2014.

Joshua dalam pernyataan terbukanya, antara lain mengatakan sisi gelap Indonesia dan secara umum sisi gelap kemanusiaan ini mewujudkan dalam satu calon presiden, Prabowo Subianto. "Sekalipun Prabowo sendiri tidak muncul dalam film Jagal," kata Joshua.

Berikut surat pernyataan terbuka Joshua yang diterbitkan dalam dua bahasa, Indonesia dan Inggris:

Film Jagal (The Act of Killing) memaparkan suasana hari ini yang dihantui korupsi, ketakutan, dan premanisme, kesemuanya dilandaskan pada impunitas atas pelanggaran berat hak asasi manusia berikut kejahatan terhadap kemanusiaan.

Film Jagal menggambarkan para oligarki yang menjarah sebuah bangsa yang bergelut dengan trauma, yang mengipasi kebencian rasis anti-Tionghoa, yang mengutus para preman untuk melaksanakan pekerjaan kotor mereka—termasuk membunuh dalam skala besar—untuk memperkaya diri mereka sendiri, dan untuk terus menggenggam kekuasaan.

Sisi gelap Indonesia dan secara umum sisi gelap kemanusiaan ini mewujud dalam satu calon presiden, Prabowo Subianto, sekalipun Prabowo sendiri tidak muncul dalam film Jagal.

Oleh karena itu saya berharap Jokowi akan terpilih sebagai presiden pada 9 Juli mendatang. Jokowi bukanlah seorang oligarki. Sebagai Gubernur DKI Jakarta, ia telah menunjukkan kepeduliannya pada problema rakyat kebanyakan, mungkin jauh lebih peduli daripada politisi yang manapun sejak genosida 1965, ketika Soeharto dan para kroninya mengubah pemerintahan menjadi kleptokrasi yang bertahan hingga hari ini. Kita bisa, setidaknya, berharap bahwa Jokowi akan membawa perjalanan politik nasional ke arah yang baru. Kita tak mungkin menggantungkan harapan seperti ini pada Prabowo.

Di atas segalanya, saya berharap Jokowi menang karena, tidak seperti pesaingnya, Jokowi tidak pernah melakukan pelanggaran hak asasi manusia. Jokowi tidak pernah menculik atau membunuh manusia lain, dan tidak pernah dituduh berbuat demikian.

Beberapa hari terakhir ini, banyak yang bertanya, mengapa saya peduli. Seringkali, pertanyaan tersebut diikuti dengan pertanyaan lanjutan: mengapa saya tidak memusatkan perhatian pada pelanggaran hak asasi manusia yang dilakukan oleh pemerintah negara saya sendiri, Amerika Serikat? Pada pertanyaan kedua, jawaban saya sederhana: Itulah yang sedang saya lakukan. Pemerintah negara saya juga adalah pelaku genosida 1965 di Indonesia, dan pelaku berbagai kejahatan di seluruh dunia.

Saya malu akan hal ini, demikian juga seharusnya warga Amerika Serikat yang lain. Dan kalau kita tidak munafik, kita harus menuntut penghentian impunitas di Tanah Air, bukan hanya di luar negeri. Lima puluh tahun terlalu lama untuk menyangkal bahwa sebuah genosida adalah ‘genosida.’ Sudah waktunya bagi Amerika Serikat, Inggris Raya, dan negara-negara lain yang mendukung genosida (juga pelanggaran HAM selanjutnya yang dilakukan rezim Orde Baru) mengakui peran mereka di dalam berbagai kejahatan ini, dan menjelaskan kepada publik rincian peran serta mereka. Seperti pemerintah Indonesia, pemerintah negara saya pun harus bertanggung jawab sepenuhnya atas perannya dalam pembantaian tersebut.

Tetapi saya peduli dengan hak-hak asasi manusia di Indonesia lebih karena alasan pribadi—lebih pribadi daripada karena saya telah menghabiskan 13 tahun bekerja dengan para penyintas dan pelaku pembunuhan massal 1965. Saya peduli karena saya percaya bahwa semua pelanggaran hak asasi manusia, semua kejahatan terhadap kemanusiaan, adalah kejahatan terhadap seluruh umat manusia di mana pun. Alasan yang sebaiknya juga melandasi kepedulian Anda.

Semua orang Indonesia, dan semua manusia di mana pun, harus mencegah seorang pelanggar HAM seperti Prabowo Subianto menjadi presiden.

Joshua Oppenheimer

Sutradara film The Act of Killing

MARIA RITA

KAMPANYE HITAM: HANTU LEE ATWATER ... DI INDONESIA? 

http://indoprogress.com/2014/06/kampanye-hitam-hantu-lee-atwater-di-indonesia/

Made Supriatma

TIDAKada orang yang dianggap paling bedebah dalam sejarah politik modern Amerika selain Harvey LeRoy ‘Lee’ Atwater. Dia adalah ahli strategi, tukang plintir (spin doctor) nomor wahid, jagoan dalam hal intrik, jenius dalam memanipulasi. Lee Atwater adalah seorang operator politik. Dia bukan politisi. Tapi dia mampu mendudukkan politisi pada satu jabatan tertentu. Atwater adalah ‘Darth Vader’-nya politik Amerika. Orang yang sangat tega dan ganas, yang mampu melakukan apa saja agar klien-nya terpilih.

Lee Atwater memulai karirnya sebagai konsultan politik di selatan Amerika. Ini adalah daerah yang dalam sejarah perang saudara Amerika dikenal sebagai wilayah ‘Confederate.’ Penduduk wilayah ini anti-penghapusan perbudakan. Ini karena sebagian besar wilayahnya adalah wilayah pertanian. Salah satu warisan dari perbudakan ini adalah politik ras. Namun, sekalipun daerah-daerah ini sangat tersegregasi menurut warna kulit, politik ras tidak muncul ke permukaan hingga tahun 1960an. Sebelum itu, daerah-daerah ini adalah wilayah partai Demokrat. Karena orang kulit hitam tidak bisa memilih, maka pemilih kulit putih lebih mengutamakan kelas. Demokrat, yang progresif dan berorientasi pada kelas pekerja, selalu menjadi mayoritas di situ. Namun itu tidak berlaku di akhir tahun 1960an.

Adalah Richard Nixon yang mengubah peta politik di wilayah tersebut. Setelah UU Hak-hak Sipil (Civil Rights Act)disahkan Presiden Lyndon B. Johnson (Demokrat) tahun 1964, diskriminasi terhadap orang kulit hitam dihapuskan. Yang paling penting dari UU ini, selain penghapusan diskriminasi atas dasar ras, warna kulit, agama, jenis kelamin, atau kebangsaan, adalah pemberian hak memilih untuk orang kulit hitam. UU ini mengubah semua dimensi politik di wilayah Selatan. Nixon memperhatikan ini dengan cermat. Dia memanipulasi politik di wilayah itu untuk menarik suara kaum kulit putih. Dan itu berhasil dengan baik.

Strategi untuk menggalang suara berdasarkan ras ini dikenal dengan nama ‘the Southern strategy.’ Karena diskriminasi atas nama apapun dilarang secara hukum, maka para operator politik bekerja dengan bahasa ‘kode.’ Mereka tidak mengungkapkan secara terbuka kebenciannya kepada orang kulit hitam, tetapi lewat kode-kode, seperti, misalnya, kerawanan sosial (artinya: orang kulit hitam itu kriminal); kupon makanan (orang kulit hitam itu pemalas dan jadi beban karena pajak yang Anda bayar dipakai untuk mensubsidi makanan mereka); rumah bersubsidi; jaminan sosial, dan lain sebagainya. Politik ini juga dikenal dengan nama politik ‘siulan anjing’ (dog whistle politics). Karena ada siulan anjing yang frekuensi suaranya hanya bisa didengar oleh anjing tapi tidak oleh manusia.

Inilah keahlian Lee Atwater. Dia memulai karirnya dengan menjadi operator politik senator Strom Thurmond dari negara bagian South Carolina. Senator ini terkenal sebagai pendukung politik segregasi dan penentang pemberian hak-hak sipil untuk kaum kulit hitam. Namun, beberapa bulan setelah dia meninggal, terungkap bahwa dia memiliki seorang putri dari seorang perempuan kulit hitam yang bekerja di rumahnya (sangat khas Amerika!). Saat bekerja untuk Senator Thurmond inilah Lee Atwater mengembangkan bakatnya sebagai bedebah politik. Dia membikin konferensi pers dengan menanam beberapa orang reporter palsu di antara reporter betulan. Reporter palsu ini mengajukan pertanyaan-pertanyaan yang memojokkan lawan politiknya. Dia juga mengirim surat-surat langsung ke pemilih (direct mail) yang memberikan informasi palsu tentang lawan politiknya. Lee juga ahli dalam memanipulasi media. Dia akan memberikan informasi off the record tentang lawan politiknya kepada media – dan karena dia memiliki kualitas kepribadian yang demikian meyakinkan maka si wartawan merasa tidak perlu melakukan cross-checking. Dia juga membikin survey-survey palsu yang menunjukkan keunggulan calonnya. Survey-survey ini diharapkan akan memunculkan ‘band-wagon effect’ yaitu efek seperti gerbong yang menarik gerbong lainnya.

Lee Atwater berjasa membantu kemenangan Ronald Reagan di wilayah Selatan, yang kemudian membawa Reagan ke tampuk kepresidenan pada 1980. Lee kemudian ikut ke Washington dan menjadi wakil direktur urusan politik Gedung Putih. Dia juga wakil manajer kampanye pemilihan kembali Reagan tahun 1984. Manajer kampanye Reagan saat itu, Ed Rollins, menyebut Atwater menjalankan ‘taktik-taktik kotor’ khususnya terhadap calon wakil presiden Geraldine Ferraro (perempuan pertama yang menjadi calon wakil presiden Amerika!). Atwater mengampanyekan bahwa orangtua Geraldin Ferraro pernah ditahan karena berjualan togel (toto gelap).

Prestasi utama Atwater adalah pada 1988 ketika dia menjalankan kampanye George H.W. Bush Sr. Ketika itu, kampanye Bush hancur berantakan. Opini publik pada musim panas menunjukkan posisi Bush pada angka -17 persen. Namun saat pemilihan bulan November, Lee Atwater menjungkirbalikkan keadaan itu. Lawan Bush, Gubernur negara bagian Massachusetts, Michael Dukakis, diserang dengan taktik paling kotor yang pernah dipakai dalam pemilu AS. Lee Atwater memproduksi sebuah video kampanye yang menggambarkan seorang terpidana yang bernama Willie Horton. Disana digambarkan Bush sebagai orang yang pro hukuman mati; sementara Dukakis adalah anti-hukuman mati. Tidak itu saja, Dukakis disebutkan mendukung program yang membolehkan tahanan keluar penjara saat akhir pekan. Di sinilah Willie Horton mengambil peranan. Pria kulit hitam ini dihukum seumur hidup, tetapi boleh menikmati ‘liburan’ akhir pekan keluar penjara. Semasa ‘liburan’ itulah Horton menyerang dua orang yang berpasangan, membacok, dan memperkosa yang perempuan.

Iklan ini jelas adalah sebuah ‘kode.’ Dalam konteks rasial masyarakat Amerika, ini adalah kode lunaknya Dukakis terhadap orang kulit hitam. Tidak itu saja. Penekanan rasial dalam video kampanye ini mengirimkan sinyal kepada ras kulit putih, yang menjadi mayoritas pemilih: keamanan Anda menjadi taruhan kalau Anda memilih Dukakis! Para kriminal itu (baca: kulit hitam) akan bebas berkeliaran untuk merampok, membunuh, dan memperkosa.

Iklan Willie Horton itu menjadi sangat fenomenal. Bukan karena keberhasilannya dalam menjungkirbalikan posisi politik Bush sehingga membuat dia terpilih sebagai presiden, tetapi karena unsur rasialnya. Iklan ini memainkan emosi dan ketakutan tidak beralasan orang kulit putih terhadap kulit hitam. Ia menguatkan semua prasangka yang memang sudah ada dan menyuburkannya. Ia mampu menghimpunorang kulit putih berbondong-bondong mencoblos (pemilihan bukan suatu kewajiban di Amerika).

Kampanye model ini tidak terjadi sekali dua kali saja. Hampir setiap periode pemilihan pasti diwarnai oleh kampanye hitam ini. Ada yang ditempuh dengan bisik-bisik, ada juga lewat bombardir iklan TV yang menyesatkan. Ambillah contoh kampanye Senator John McCain pada tahun 2000. Saat kampanye penyisihan (primary campaign) untuk menjadi calon Partai Republik, McCain harus menghadapi tuduhan bahwa dia memiliki anak kulit hitam hasil hubungan gelapnya. McCain memang memiliki putri angkat yang berasal dari Bangladesh. Pahlawan perang Vietnam ini memang sedang memperoleh momentum karena kemenangannya di New Hampsire. Lawannya adalah George W. Bush Jr, yang kemudian menjadi presiden. Ketika pemilihan di South Carolina, McCain harus menghadapi tuduhan ini, yang disebarkan lewat selebaran dari rumah ke rumah. Inilah yang membuatnya terjungkal dan George Bush menjadi calon presiden dari Partai Republik.

Hal yang sama juga dialami John Kerry pada tahun 2004. Kerry, seorang veteran perang Vietnam, menerima medalithe purple heart karena terluka di Vietnam. Pada kampanye pemilihan presiden melawan George Bush, Kerry diserang lewat iklan kampanye oleh kelompok yang menamakan dirinya Swift Boat Veterans for Truth. Kelompok ini mempertanyakan medali yang diterima Kerry, terutama karena Kerry pernah bersaksi di depan Kongres tentang kekejaman tentara Amerika di Vietnam. Para veteran, yang terluka atau yang pernah ditawan itu bertanya, ‘Jika Kerry tidak loyal terhadap kawan seperjuangannya, bagaimana dia bisa loyal terhadap negara?’

Ada satu hal yang juga penting digarisbawahi baik pada kampanye hitam ataupun kampanye negatif. Yang diserang bukan bagian yang lemah dari lawan politiknya. Namun, justru yang paling kuat. Dukakis diserang karena kebijakannya yang ingin memperbaiki sistem ‘pemasyarakatan.’ Dia justru ingin sistem yang lebih manusiawi. McCain diserang karena integritasnya, baik sebagai mantan tawanan perang Vietnam, maupun karena sikapnya yang terus terang. Tuduhan memiliki anak dari hasil hubungan gelap adalah serangan yang paling fatal atas integritas dan kejujurannya. Kerry diserang, persis karena statusnya sebagai penerima medali purple heart. Dia menjadi pengritik perang Vietnam. Posisi ini sebenarnya sangat populer di kalangan masyarakat Amerika. Namun, para ahli strategi di pihak Bush dengan buas mengeskploitasinya menjadi titik lemahKerry, yakni dengan menghubungkannya dengan loyalitas terhadap kawan seperjuangan. Bush berhasil mengeksploitasi sentimen nasionalisme.

‘Jokowi! Jokowi! Orangnya belum sunat!’ Demikianlah celoteh anak-anak kecil yang didengar oleh sastrawan AS Laksana di dekat rumahnya. Tentu saja ini diucapkan sambil bermain. Namun ada sesuatu yang serius di sini. Permainan anak-anak itu menjadi sebuah pertanda bahwa smear campaign (kampanye fitnah) yang dilancarkan oleh kubu lawan Jokowi itu bekerja dengan baik. Dia sudah sampai ke tingkat anak-anak. Jika para orangtua hanya mendengarnya lewat bisik-bisik, anak-anak meneruskannya menjadi pengumuman.

Yang jelas, kampanye hitam hadir dalam pemilihan presiden Indonesia 2014. Bahkan, dia hadir dalam skala yang tidak pernah terlihat sebelumnya. Kampanye hitam lebih banyak ditujukan kepada kandidat Joko Widodo (Jokowi) ketimbang Prabowo Subianto. Mengapa? Ini karena problem berbeda yang dihadapi oleh kedua calon. Masalah utama yang harus dihadapi oleh Prabowo Subianto adalah data, terutama data sejarah yang berupa rekam jejaknya pada masa lalu. Sementara, tantangan utama Joko Widodo adalah kampanye hitam baik dalam bentuk disinformasi, tuduhan rasial dan agama, maupun rekam jejak dalam kehidupan publiknya sebagai politisi.

Prabowo Subianto memiliki beban ‘data masa lalu’ yang cukup berat, yang mungkin tidak akan berhenti dipertanyakan, bahkan kalau dia terpilih menjadi presiden. Namun, di balik semua itu, Prabowo jelas figur yang lebih dikenal oleh publik Indonesia ketimbang Jokowi. Jika Prabowo bagaikan sebuah buku novel, maka Jokowi bagaikan buku kosong yang perlu ditulis. Semua orang tahu akan sepak terjang Prabowo, mulai dari kakeknya, ayahnya, dan mertuanya (Suharto). Juga rekam jejaknya sebagai perwira militer, tingkah lakunya dalam banyak kasus pelanggaran HAM, dan kehidupannya sesudah dipecat dari dinas militer. Terlebih lagi, setelah ‘dipecat dengan hormat’ dari dinas militer, Prabowo menghabiskan hampir seluruh karirnya untuk berkampanye menjadi Presiden Republik Indonesia.

Sebaliknya, Jokowi adalah figur yang baru melejit ke publik selama dua tahun terakhir ini. Sebelum itu dia hanya dikenal di lingkup Surakarta, Jawa Tengah, dimana dia menjadi walikota. Dia mulai mendapat perhatian luas dari publik saat dia mencalonkan diri untuk gubernur DKI Jakarta. Sejak saat itu, karir politiknya menanjak tajam. Namun, tidak banyak orang kenal siapa dia. Pengetahuan publik hanya terbatas pada apa yang dia kerjakan sebagai walikota Surakarta dan sebentar menjadi gubernur DKI Jakarta. Itulah sebabnya, Jokowi itu bagaikan buku kosong yang butuh untuk diisi tulisan. Di sinilah lawan dan sekutu politiknya berusaha untuk mengisi halaman-halaman buku itu. Lawan dan kawan politik Jokowi berusaha memberikan definisi tentang siapa Jokowi sebenarnya.

Persis di titik itu kampanye hitam bekerja. Lawan-lawan Jokowi segera masuk mengisi ruang kosong ini. Persis seperti Lee Atwater memberikan kode rasial kepada pemilih Amerika tahun 1988, bahwa memilih Dukakis berarti memihak pada orang kulit hitam. Implikasinya adalah kriminalitas akan menanjak, dominasi orang kulit putih akan melemah, dan secara otomatis akan mengubah tatanan rasial yang sudah ada. Kampanye Lee Atwater memainkan ketakutan orang-orang kulit putih.

Hal yang sama berlaku untuk Jokowi. Lawan-lawan politiknya berusaha mendefinisikan Jokowi sebagai Kristen dan keturunan Cina. Dia dituduh menyembunyikan identitas kekeristenan dan kecinaannya. Dalam kampanye fitnah tersebut, nama asli Jokowi adalah Herbertus Handoko Joko Widodo bin Oey Hong Liong (Noto Mihardjo). Foto Jokowi saat menikah beredar yang mengungkapkan bahwa dia adalah keturunan Cina yang menyembunyikan identitas sukunya (a closet Chinese). Sementara itu juga beredar iklan dukacita, lengkap dengan aksara Cina. Iklan itu juga menginsinuasi bahwa Jokowi adalah Kristen keturunan Cina.

Kampanye hitam ini adalah fitnah (smear campaign) secara membabi buta. Jika kampanye hitam di Amerika pada umumnya ditujukan kepada orang kulit putih dan memainkan ketakutan rasial mereka, maka di Indonesia kampanye ini secara khusus ditujukan kepada kalangan Muslim. Kampanye ini memainkan perasaan kalangan Muslim Indonesia, terutama ketakutan akan dikuasai oleh Kristen. Setelah Suharto tumbang, sektarianisme berdasarkan agama memang menguat di Indonesia. Ini menyumbang pada ketakutan bahwa umat Islam akan diperintah oleh orang beragama Kristen. Sementara, sentimen anti-Cina pun masih kuat di bawah permukaan. Sekalipun setelah Suharto jatuh kerusuhan rasial anti-Cina sangat berkurang drastis namun prasangka rasial terhadap orang Cina masih sangat kuat. Prasangka rasial ini memang tidak muncul ke permukaan. Tapi dia menjadi semacam ‘hidden transcript’ di kalangan masyarakat Indonesia. Dia dibicarakan di ruang-ruang keluarga, di dalam suasana yang akrab, dan jarang muncul ke publik. Namun ia ada.

Seiring dengan berjalannya kampanye pemilihan presiden, tekanan kampanye hitam ini makin menghebat. Serangan terhadap Jokowi tidak saja berlangsung dari mulut ke mulut dan lewat media sosial. Ia kemudian ditingkatkan ke dalam bentuk tabloid yakni Obor Rakyat. Tabloid ini secara samar-sama memiliki kaitan dengan kampanye Prabowo-Hatta. Tabloid ini pun diedarkan dengan target yang jelas, yakni kalangan Islam khususnya basis-basis Islam tradisional, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). Isinya sebagian besar memperkuat apa yang sudah didengar sebelumnya. Obor Rakyat agaknya akan menjadi cara baru kampanye di Indonesia. Dia menyamarkan diri sebagai karya jurnalistik, walaupun sesungguhnya dia menunggangi dunia jurnalisme untuk melancarkan kampanye hitam.

Setiyardi, asisten staf khusus Presiden, pemred Obor Rakyat, media corong kampanye hitam

Setelah beberapa minggu mengamati kampanye pemilihan presiden di Indonesia, saya mendapati betapa mirip pola-pola kampanye ini dilakukan menurut ‘political campaign playbook’ yang dijalankan dalam politik Amerika. Ini secara khusus tampak di kubu Prabowo Subianto. Serangan-serangan, baik yang dibawah tanah dalam bentuk kampanye hitam maupun di atas permukaan dalam serangan politik formal, terlihat sangat biasa untuk mereka yang biasa mengamati politik Amerika.

Di atas permukaan, serangan paling awal terhadap Jokowi adalah sebagai presiden ‘boneka.’ Uniknya, dia tidak dituduh sebagai boneka asing (baru kemudian tuduhan itu muncul) tetapi sebagai boneka Megawati Sukarnoputri, ketua PDIP, partai yang mencalonkan Jokowi. Kubu Prabowo-Hatta tahu persis bahwa kekuatan Jokowi bukan karena dukungan PDIP terhadap dirinya. Kekuatan utamanya adalah populisme yang melintasi garis partai. Jokowi maju bertarung untuk kursi kepresidenan karena ‘diwajibkan’ (conscripted) oleh kalangan independen.

Para ahli strategi di kubu Prabowo berusaha mementahkan ini dengan ‘mengembalikan’ Jokowi kepada Megawati yang popularitasnya memang sangat rendah di kalangan pemilih Indonesia. Menyerang kekuatan lawan, dan bukan kelemahannya, adalah sesuatu yang sangat umum terjadi di dalam poltik Amerika.

Namun serangan yang paling berhasil adalah dalam bentuk kampanye hitam (atau lebih tepatnya smear campaign – kampanye fitnah). Kampanye ini dilakukan oleh kelompok-kelompok di luar tim kampanye resmi. Serangannya pun sangat frontal dan mematikan. Dia menusuk langsung ke psyche masyarakat Indonesia, memainkan ketakutan-ketakutan sektarian dan rasial. Kampanye model ini dipakai karena hasilnya luar biasa bagus. Kampanye hitam, selain memberikan definisi tentang siapa Jokowi itu juga berfungsi untuk mobilisasi.1 Orang-orang yang ketakutan akan berbondong-bondong memenuhi bilik-bilik suara.

Sedemikian miripnya serangan-serangan dan organisasi kampanye Prabowo-Hatta dengan pola-pola kampanye di Amerika, tentu membuat kita bertanya-tanya: Adakah campur tangan operator politik yang berpengalaman dalam politik Amerika dalam mengelola kampanye Prabowo? Selama ini, pers Indonesia meributkan bahwa kubu Prabowo Subianto mendapatkan bantuan dari konsultan politik Amerika dari Partai Republik yang bernama, Rob Allyn. Kubu Prabowo membantah bahwa Allyn memberikan konsultasi. Namun mereka tidak membantah kalau Allyn bekerja untuk perusahan yang dikontrak oleh tim kampanye kubu Prabowo.2

Rob Allyn mungkin bukan figur yang penting dalam politik Amerika. Satu-satunya prestasi paling penting Allyn adalah membuat Gubernur George W. Bush terpilih kembali di Texas tahun 1994. Allyn lebih banyak menangani politisi lokal di AS. Namun, Allyn dan perusahan konsultannya memiliki nama besar di luar AS. Dia berhasil menaikkan Vincente Fox menjadi presiden Meksiko tahun 2000.3 Sejak itu, Allyn mengembangkan usahanya di luar AS. Dia mulai bergerak di Indonesia diperkirakan sekitar tahun 2004, dengan menjadi konsultan politik untuk Partai Golkar.4 Saat ini, Allyn mengaku kepada Dallas Observer bahwa dia hidup selama sembilan bulan dalam setahun di Indonesia.

Mungkin ada tangan Rob Allyn dalam membangun strategi kampanye di kubu Prabowo. Mungkin juga tidak. Akan tetapi warna Amerika sangat kuat tercermin dalam kampanye Presiden Indonesia 2014.

Terakhir, apa konsekuensi kampanye hitam terhadap politisi yang berhasil terpilih ke tampuk kekuasaan? Saya melihat dua konsekuensi penting. Pertama, terhadap lawan politiknya. Seorang politisi yang terpilih menduduki satu jabatan, tetap memerlukan lawannya ketika dia memerintah. Jika kampanye adalah persoalan memecah-belah dan berusaha mencari suara yang terbanyak, memerintah (governing) adalah persoalan mempersatukan. Politisi yang dikalahkan dengan kampanye hitam akan sulit menghilangkan ‘rasa getir’ kekalahannya itu. Demikian pula pendukung-pendukungnya. Jika ini terjadi, persoalan memerintah menjadi makin sulit; oposisi semakin sulit untuk diajak bekerja sama; dan pada akhirnya akan menentukan berhasil tidaknya pemerintah yang berkuasa. Kedua,adalah ke dalam koalisi pihak yang memerintah itu sendiri. Kebanyakan kampanye hitam dilakukan secara rahasia, oleh kelompok rahasia, dan disokong oleh dana-dana gelap. Setelah berkuasa, maka penguasa harus berurusan dengan kelompok-kelompok rahasia yang membantunya menaikkan dirinya ke kekuasaan. Sangat lumrah kelompok-kelompok ini tidak puas, dan akhirnya membuka semua aib pihak yang berkuasa dan menjadikannya skandal. Kerahasian (secretiveness) selalu memiliki harga mahal yang harus dibayar.

Pemerintahan yang dihasilkan lewat kampanye hitam berlebihan akan terus menerus berada dalam mode kampanye dan tidak sempat memerintah. Untuk itu, presiden terpilih harus tetap dikelilingi oleh konsultan-konsultan politik. Jika dia menang dalam pemilihan 9 Juli nanti, Presiden Prabowo Subianto mungkin juga harus mencari konsultan politik yang baru, yakni konsultan yang menangani cara memerintah. Kali ini, mungkin konsultan tersebut harus datang dari Russia, mengingat betapa kuatnya Presiden Putin berkuasa di sana.***

Penulis adalah peneliti masalah-masalah politik militer dan jurnalis lepas (freelance). Tulisannya pernah muncul di Prisma, Jurnal Indonesia, dan Inside Indonesia.

1Lihat, misalnya, Paul S. Martin, ‘Inside the Black Box of Negative Campaign Effects: Three Reasons Why Negative Campaigns Mobilize,’ Political Psychology, Vol. 25, No. 4, Symposium on Campaigns and Elections (Aug., 2004), pp. 545-562

2Lihat keterangan Haryanto Taslam, http://nasional.inilah.com/read/detail/108985/prabowo-sewa-konsultan-bush#.U6u38ZRdXHQ

3http://www.dmagazine.com/publications/d-magazine/2001/march/mr-mexico

4http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/28/business/media/28adco.html Harian The New York Times, 28 Desember 2006 menyebutkan bahwa Allyn bekerja untuk Partai Golkar. Ada kemungkinan bahwa Allyn membantu Prabowo untuk memenangkan konvensi Partai Golkar saat itu dan tidak secara langsung membantu Partai Golkar.

Indonesien: Wahlkampf in Himmlers SS-Uniform

http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/indonesien-ss-uniform-von-heinrich-himmler-in-wahlkampf-video-a-977207.html

Sänger Ahmad Dhani in Himmler-Uniform: "Indonesien erwache!"

"We Will Rock You" in Nazi-Ästhetik: Ex-General Prabowo Subianto setzt im Kampf um das indonesische Präsidentenamt auf martialisches Auftreten - und auf einen Sänger in Heinrich-Himmler-Uniform. Bei den Wählern kommt das an.

Jakarta - In zwei Wochen wählt das größte islamische Land der Welt einen neuen Staatschef. Mehr als 185 Millionen Indonesier haben am 9. Juli die Wahl zwischen zwei Präsidentschaftskandidaten - dem Gouverneur der Hauptstadt Jakarta, Joko Widodo, und Ex-General Prabowo Subianto.

Der charismatische Widodo, Spitzname Jokowi, geht als Favorit in die letzten Wochen des Wahlkampfs. Doch sein Gegenkandidat zieht alle Register. Für den Schlussspurt veröffentlichte Prabowos Wahlkampfteam einen Song, der besonders die jungen Indonesier begeistern soll.

Zur Melodie des Queen-Klassikers "We Will Rock You" skandieren vier prominente indonesische Popstars die Namen von Prabowo und seinem Vize-Kandidaten Hatta Rajasa. Weiter heißt es im Text: "Indonesien erwache, Wer sonst vermag Indonesien zu erwecken aus seiner Misere? Wer sonst, wenn nicht wir?"

Prabowo spielt mit Nazi-Ästhetik

Brisanter als der Songtext ist jedoch das Outfit des Sängers Ahmad Dhani. Er trägt eine schwarze Uniformjacke, die der Uniform von SS-Führer Heinrich Himmler zum Verwechseln ähnelt. Dhani trägt die gleichen Kragenspiegel und den sogenannten Blutorden auf der Brust.

DPA

SS-Führer Himmler: Spiel mit der Nazi-Ästhetik

Diese bewusst inszenierte Assoziation mit Symbolen des Nazi-Regimes findet in Indonesien regen Anklang. Das "Dritte Reich" gilt vielen als Vorbild in puncto militärischer Stärke und staatlicher Effizienz. Adolf Hitlers "Mein Kampf" wird in vielen Buchläden verkauft. In der Stadt Bandung gibt es sogar ein Café, in dem Kellner in SS-Uniformen Speisen und Getränke servieren.

Auch Präsidentschaftskandidat Prabowo setzt in seinem Wahlkampf auf Militärästhetik. Auf seiner offiziellen Facebook-Seite zeigt sich der Politiker in den Uniformen der Miliz seiner Gerindra-Partei, der "Bewegung für ein Großindonesien".

Furcht vor Wahlsieg des Ex-Generals

Prabowo ist der Ex-Schwiegersohn des langjährigen Diktators Suharto. Als General befehligte er in den Achtziger- und Neunzigerjahren Massaker in der Unruheprovinz Osttimor. Zuvor war er unter anderem von der GSG 9 in der Bundesrepublik ausgebildet worden.

Nach dem Sturz seines Schwiegervaters 1998 ging Prabowo für einige Zeit ins Exil nach Jordanien. Nach seiner Rückkehr in die Heimat gründete er 2008 die Gerindra-Partei.

Im aktuellen Wahlkampf galt er lange als aussichtslos im Duell mit seinem Widersacher Jokowi. In den vergangenen Wochen hat sich der Abstand zwischen den beiden Spitzenkandidaten in den Umfragen rapide verringert. Inzwischen gehen die Medien in Indonesien von einem Kopf-an-Kopf-Rennen aus.

Demokratieaktivisten und Journalisten fürchten bei einem Wahlsieg Prabowos einen Rückfall in die dunklen Zeiten der Diktatur.

syd

YouTube removes Nazi-themed Indonesian video based on Queen hit

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/27/youtube-removes-indonesian-nazi-themed-video-emi-queen-we-will-rock-you

Mark Tran

A man watches rock star Ahmad Dhani in the video Indonesia Bangkit. Photograph: Bagus Indahono/EPA

A Nazi-themed video performed by Indonesian musicians based on Queen's We Will Rock has been removed by YouTube after a copyright claim by EMIMusic Publishing.

Indonesia Bangkit, or Awakening Indonesia, sparked international outrage when it showed Indonesian rocker Ahmad Dhani in black military uniform and dark sunglasses holding a huge golden garuda bird, Indonesia's national emblem, and other singers performing the song with lyrics supporting Prabowo Subianto, a candidate in the presidential election on 9 July.

Critics said Dhani was wearing a military jacket identical to that often worn by SS chief Heinrich Himmler. Indonesian-born singer and songwriter Anggun Cipta Sasmi tweeted that the video had left her "shocked, disappointed and ashamed".

She added: "I pray that Indonesia does not descend into fascism."

Daniel Ziv, a Bali-based filmmaker, described the video as bringing "Nazi skinhead imagery to Indonesian politics".

Brian May, Queen's lead guitarist, has objected to the purloining of the song, tweeting: "Of course this is completely unauthorised by us."

The video was uploaded to YouTube on 19 June as a campaign song for Prabowo, a former general who has been accused of abducting pro-democracy activists in 1998. Although it can no longer be seen on YouTube, it can still be viewed at a number of media sites, including US news magazine Time.

Dhani, who is partly Jewish, has remained defiant despite the uproar.

"What's the connection between German soldiers and Indonesia?" was his comment to Indonesian media. "What's the connection between German soldiers and Indonesian musicians? We, the Indonesian people, didn't kill millions of Jewish people, right?"

Dhani's music video for Prabowo was released shortly after pop musicians including Oppie Andaresta and rock band Slank, who support Joko "Jokowi" Widodo – the governor of Jakarta and frontrunner – made their own song and music video, called Two-Finger Salute. With the vote imminent, supporters of both presidential candidates are using social media aimed at young, urban voters.

The latest poll supports most other recent polls showing Jokowi ahead, but with the size of his lead narrowing. Most also show a sizeable percentage of undecided voters. The state-funded Indonesian Institute of Sciences survey of 790 voters from 5-24 June found 43% support for Jokowi and 34% for Prabowo.

A controversial figure, Prabowo was discharged from military service in 1998 over the abduction of pro-democracy activists. He has appeared at campaign rallies on horseback before an honour guard, in keeping with the strongman image he likes to project.

Allan Nairn, an American journalist who has covered Indonesia extensively, posted on his blog a 2001 interview in which Prabowo said that Indonesia needed "a benign authoritarian regime". The former general, who made clear his admiration toward Pakistan's then ruling strongman Pervez Musharraf, told Nairn: "Do I have the guts, am I ready to be called a fascist dictator? Musharraf had the guts."

Nairn on Thursday challenged Prabowo's campaign to carry out its threat to have him arrested because of what he had written about the general.

"General Prabowo, the brother of a billionaire, was the son-in-law of the dictator Suharto, and as a US trainee and protégé was implicated in torture, kidnap and mass murder," wrote Nairn. 

Keith Urban: Searching for a heart in Urban country

http://theboot.com/keith-urban-somewhere-in-my-car/

Keith Urban has released the fifth single, ‘Somewhere in My Car,’ from his No. 1 album, ‘Fuse.’

The Aussie is keeping with a car theme, since his previous single was ‘Cop Car,’ but the two songs couldn’t be more different. In his current tune, he sings, “But in my mind, we’re somewhere in my car / And it’s raining hard on the streetlight glow / You got your lips on mine, it’s gasoline on fire / I never will forget, you grabbed my shirt and pulled it over my head / And your fingertips slide up and down my back.”

Urban co-wrote the song with J.T. Harding, and played it for the sold-out crowd during the 2014 CMA Music Fest, saying it was about “reminiscing and missing an old love.”

‘Somewhere in My Car’ is part of an eclectic list of songs from ‘Fuse,’ which Urban says stemmed from a desire to reach out of his comfort zone.

“Part of the record started out from sort of a sonic, rhythmic instrumentation aspect, bringing things together that I hadn’t done before,” he explains.

“It’s been incredibly liberating, creatively, for me,” he adds. “I don’t know why that is, because I’ve always been fortunate enough to make the records I want to make. I think just working with other people has just been a really enjoyable thing.”

Urban is currently on tour in Australia, before he returns to the United States to resume his role as judge on Season 14 of ‘American Idol.’ He is set to embark on the Raise ‘Em Up Tour in July, with special guests Jerrod Niemann and Brett Eldredge. See a list of all of his upcoming shows here.

Download ‘Fuse’ here.

http://m.smh.com.au/entertainment/music/searching-for-a-heart-in-urban-country-20140622-zshqy.html



Before we get to the question which must be put to Our Keith, let’s acknowledge some unequivocally praiseworthy elements, beginning with the fact the man can play guitar superbly. And not just his regular flashy-but-appropriate solos but several really impressive moments on solo acoustic guitar such as Making Memories Of Us.

He is also natural and good-bloke-charming between songs: bringing to the stage a 12-year-old girl whose sign says she’s loved him for 11 years (what happened to that wasted year, mum and dad?); congratulating NSW on the Origin win as a Queenslander (via New Zealand – which as we know is in Queensland) married to a New South Welshwoman; confessing said wife (apparently she’s also well known and was somewhere in the room) had had doubts about him before they married eight years ago but graciously gave him a chance.

In a smartly produced and well paced show he packages his Australian references neatly, with Jessica Mauboy and, to even greater applause, Jimmy Barnes joining him for a curiously jaunty take on Cold Chisel’s When The War Is Over and a politely rousing Long Way To The Top. (What the permanently unnecessary Joel Madden was doing here for a wistfulness-free Wonderwall – yes, the Oasis song – is something only the TV show marketers can answer.)

But maybe most impressive of all in this context is that in performance, even if he is known as a country act, he refuses to pretend that he, these songs or this show are in any way related to country music. Whereas most modern commercial country acts throw in pedal steel occasionally, drop in a banjo solo once or twice or run through some fiddle to prove even a tenuous connection to the roots of their nominal musical label, on stage Urban says bugger that for a game of soldiers.

Sure, there’s electric banjo visible several times and a mandolin once too, but they’re buried in the mix so his opening, Love’s Poster Child, could have been an Aerosmith song in their 80s revival (clean “dirty” guitar, thick drums and Desmond Child-standard chorus) while Good Thing nods to sub-Lynyrd southern rock. Sweet Thing and Put You In A Song are crafted pop which take cues from Bryan (and certainly not Ryan) Adams while Used To The Pain comes across like Foreigner and Somewhere In My Car is straight out middle American rock which offers hope for nondescript Australian bands such as Eskimo Joe that they should change nothing except to call themselves “country”.

Indonesia on the knife’s edge

http://inside.org.au/indonesia-on-the-knifes-edge/
Edward Aspinall



The outside world should be worried by the possibility that Prabowo Subianto could become Indonesian president, writes Edward Aspinall, but the biggest losers will be Indonesia’s own people 

Indonesia’s presidential election on 9 July will determine not only the future government of the country but also the fate of its democracy. Over the past decade and a half, Indonesia has been the democratic success story of Southeast Asia. Thailand has lurched back to its tradition of military coups, and Malaysia and Singapore have languished under semi-democratic regimes, but Indonesian democracy looked like it was striking deep roots. Nobody would claim that the country didn’t have serious political problems – chief among them, pervasive corruption – but its many achievements include the evolution of a robust media, the sidelining of the military from daily political life, a strong culture of open electoral competition, and significant devolution of power and finances to the regions.

Now, the country faces a stark choice that could determine not only the health of Indonesian democracy, but perhaps even whether it survives. The two candidates running in this election embody very different aspects of Indonesia’s recent political history, and they promise to take the country in very different directions.

The choice

The leading candidate is Joko Widodo (usually known as Jokowi). Politically, he is purely a product of the new democratic era. A political nobody at the beginning of Indonesia’s democratic transformation, he came to prominence by being elected twice as the mayor of the Central Java city of Solo and then once as governor of Jakarta – a pathway to national power that would have been impossible under the old authoritarian system. Known for a low-key, meet-the-people style of interacting with constituents, he comes from a humble background, though he achieved success as a furniture exporter prior to entering politics. His style of governing emphasises bureaucratic reform, improved service delivery, expanded social welfare services and a consensus-based approach to resolving social conflict.

Though we don’t really know Jokowi’s views on many critical issues (such as how to resolve the conflict in Papua), he would be the first president without firsthand experience of official politics in the authoritarian period and, arguably, the most reformist president yet. While we would not expect dramatic change under his leadership, he would pay patient attention to strengthening Indonesia’s democratic institutions and getting the wheels of Indonesia’s massive bureaucracy turning more smoothly, and more cleanly.

Prabowo Subianto, Jokowi’s only rival in a two-candidate race, has promised to respect Indonesia’s democracy. But there is much in his personal history, his rhetoric, and his political style to suggest that a Prabowo presidency would pose a significant threat of authoritarian reversal. In contrast to Jokowi, Prabowo is one of the purest imaginable products of the authoritarian New Order regime (1966–98) of President Suharto. One of a handful of leading military generals by the time of Suharto’s fall from office, he was the son of an important early New Order economics minister and was married to Suharto’s daughter, Titiek. Prabowo’s younger brother, Hashim Djojohadikusumo, like many of the children of former New Order officials, went into business, while Prabowo was groomed for a career in the army. Hashim is now one of Indonesia’s richest men, as well the chief bankroller of Prabowo’s presidential ambitions. Prabowo himself is also extremely wealthy, living on a luxurious private ranch where, among other things, he keeps a stable of expensive horses. The brothers, it should be noted, have primarily become rich in rent-seeking parts of the economy, such as timber and other natural resources.

Back in the 1980s and 1990s, Prabowo enjoyed an unusually rapid rise through the ranks of the army under the patronage of his father-in-law. In the mid to late 1990s, when the New Order began to fray and civilian reformers tried to work out who in the army might be sympathetic to democratic change, nobody counted Prabowo among the potential reformers. Instead, he was a leader of the palace guard and, in the final months of the regime, was in charge of a dirty war–style campaign to abduct anti-government activists, several of whom remain missing to this day. President Habibie dismissed Prabowo as commander of the Army’s Strategic Reserves the day after Suharto resigned, 22 May 1998, when it was reported to him that Prabowo was moving his troops close to the presidential palace without the approval of the Armed Forces Commander. Prabowo was discharged from the military for his role in the kidnapping of the activists and for other transgressions.

Since the early 2000s, after a period abroad, Prabowo has worked hard to build a political career. From the start he focused on the goal of winning the presidency. He first tried to win the nomination of Golkar (the electoral vehicle of the old New Order regime) as its presidential candidate in 2004. When this plan failed, he decided to form his own personal vehicle, the Gerindra (Greater Indonesia Movement) party, an organisation with the sole goal of taking its leader to the presidential palace. In 2009, he ran as a vice-presidential candidate alongside Megawati Sukarnoputri, but at that time, too, he made it clear that his ultimate goal was the presidency. Although Gerindra achieved just 11.8 per cent of the popular vote in this year’s legislative election, Prabowo was the only other potential presidential candidate who came even close to Jokowi in the public opinion polls. He was eventually able to pull together a coalition of five major parties to nominate him as its presidential candidate.

A year ago, it seemed that Jokowi would win the presidency without serious challenge. He was a media sensation, and his popularity ratings far outstripped other potential candidates. In the last six months, however, Prabowo’s campaign has surged. Though Jokowi still maintains a lead it has narrowed dramatically, and is now in single figures. Nobody now takes a Jokowi victory for granted. In such a context, we need to think seriously about what underpins Prabowo’s growing appeal, and what a Prabowo presidency might mean for Indonesia.

The Prabowo challenge

How can we explain the rapid rise in support for Prabowo? One explanation is that Jokowi’s campaign has been poorly organised, as has been argued persuasively by ANU academic Marcus Mietzner. Prabowo’s effort, by contrast, has been single-minded and massively funded from the start. His brother Hashim has pumped in untold millions and, since his polling has improved, Prabowo has also been able to extract major funds from other Indonesian oligarchs and political allies. He has also gained the support of two of Indonesia’s main media tycoons, whose television channels have flagrantly campaigned in favour of him: Prabowo even appeared at the final of Indonesian Idol to award the prize to the winner. (To be fair, the news channel owned by another tycoon, Surya Paloh, has been almost equally biased in favour of Jokowi.) An army of paid social media workers floods the cyberworld with pro-Prabowo material and counter negative stories about him; the electronic media has for many months been similarly flooded with advertisements extolling his virtues.

It is also increasingly obvious that elements of Prabowo’s styling and message appeal strongly to a part of the Indonesian population. Prabowo has presented himself in a way that distinguishes him starkly from other members of Indonesia’s political elite. Part of this is visual: Prabowo’s campaign rallies involve a large element of pageantry, with marching bands and military-style parades; he dresses himself in uniforms that evoke Sukarno and other nationalist heroes from the 1940s and 1950s; he even uses old-fashioned microphones that look like those used decades ago by Sukarno. In addition to these stylistic elements, however, there are at least three features that distinguish Prabowo from other mainstream Indonesian politicians.

First is the nature of his message. Prabowo promotes an amalgam of nationalist and populist themes reminiscent of demagogic politicians the world over. In all his campaign speeches he stresses, first and foremost, nationalism, saying that Indonesia is a country of great natural riches that has for too long been exploited – even enslaved – by foreigners. Indonesia’s riches are being sucked out to benefit outsiders and it is time, he says, for the country to stand on its own feet and reclaim its dignity and self-respect. He also talks at length about the plight of the poor, and how they suffer as a result of corruption, neoliberalism, neocapitalism, foreign interference and various other ills. Indonesia’s riches are stolen from the Indonesian people; it is time for them to be reclaimed and enjoyed by all Indonesian.

Nothing in this so far is particularly unusual: economic nationalism, concern for the plight of the “little people” and condemnation of corruption are all standard tropes of Indonesian political discourse. But Prabowo’s language is far more dramatic – even militant – than that used by most politicians. What is even more unusual is that he presents these critiques along with fiery condemnation of Indonesia’s entire political class, which he depicts as irredeemably corrupt and self-serving. As he told a crowd of workers at a rally last May Day: “The Indonesian elite has lied for too long… lied to the people, lied to the nation, lied to itself!” Later in the same speech, he added, “All are corrupted! All are bribed! All our leaders are willing to be bought and willing to be bribed!” Depicting himself as the anti-political politician he explained:

We cannot hope for too much from our leaders. They are clever talkers, so clever, so clever that they end up as clever liars! I went into politics because I was forced! I was forced, brothers and sisters! Politics… God help us! Of fifteen people I meet in politics, fourteen of them are total liars….

Or, as he put it more recently, on a visit to Aceh province: “How easy it is to control Indonesia. All you need to do is buy the political parties!” Of course there is a deep irony here: Prabowo is himself a product of the very highest level of Indonesia’s political elite, and a major oligarch in his own right. Yet there’s no denying the consistency, and the force, of his message.

This leads us to a second part of Prabowo’s appeal: the passion, even sometimes fury, with which he delivers his message. This also distinguishes him from most mainstream politicians – especially the current president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who is so careful and measured in his statements that he is often criticised for indecisiveness, but also Jokowi, whose personal style is unusually casual and low-key. At a recent campaign speech in the North Sumatran city of Medan, the subject of much scrutiny, Prabowo worked himself into a frenzy condemning various unnamed foreign stooges and people who steal the people’s money, commit fraud, engage in slander and so on. As Liam Gammon argues, “it says something about his frame of mind that the only time he gets so worked up as to lose his composure is when he’s talking about some devious clique of unnamed ‘others’ who conspire to exploit the national wealth and cheat the Indonesian people.” Indeed, Prabowo’s passion doesn’t look concocted on such occasions; he appears as if seized by deep personal emotions. It looks, in fact, as if he is thinking about his personal enemies.

This particular strength is potentially also a weak point. Prabowo is known to have a combustible, even unstable, personality. He is prone to outbursts of rage that sometimes involve physical violence, and reports of him throwing punches, mobile telephones and ashtrays when angered by his associates or underlings have circulated widely. Former factional rivals from within the military have described his personality flaws quite openly, and one, A.M. Hendropriyono (himself a man with a bad human rights record), has denounced him as a “psychopath.” Prabowo’s emotion-laden public speeches could thus be a double-edged sword, and may turn off some voters, especially women. Even so, there’s no doubt that many Indonesians – especially poorer ones – enjoy the unusual spectacle of a prominent figure getting so exercised, apparently on their behalf, in condemning the very politicians and elites they themselves abhor.

The third element of Prabowo’s appeal is the promised antidote to all these ills: leadership that is “firm” or “strong.” Indeed, we might think of the promise of strong leadership as not merely the central, but as virtually the only significant plank of Prabowo’s political program and his strategy for government. In a recent analysis, University of British Columbia historian John Roosa has compellingly argued that “in Prabowo’s mind, everything about a country – the quality of its economic system, culture, and international standing – depends on the ‘leadership factor.’ The solution for all of Indonesia’s ills is a ‘strong national leadership.’” Accordingly, Prabowo’s speeches are self-referential and self-regarding to an extent that is unusual in Indonesian politics, and he often teasingly asks his audience whether he is being “too tough” or “too hard” in his denunciations.

In many casual conversations I have had with ordinary Indonesians over recent months, almost all those who say they will support Prabowo repeat the same refrain: Indonesia needs a leader who is tough, who will stamp down on corruption, who will stand up to foreign countries, who will prevent the repeat of “losses” such as East Timor, and so on. Public opinion polling also shows that voters who value firm leadership as a factor in making their choice overwhelming favour Prabowo. The irony, of course, is that for all his talk of leadership, Prabowo has actually not led anything in the last sixteen years, except for a political party that was concocted simply to provide him with a platform. When he did last hold a senior leadership position in a state body, he was fired from it.

A threat to democracy?

Prabowo is directing his campaign for the presidency through democratic channels. Recently, he has taken pains to state that he accepts Indonesia’s democratic system, and that he intends to preserve it. If he takes power, he will do so with the support of a coalition of political parties that have an interest in preserving democratic participation. He will also be operating in a system that includes robust checks and balances, as well as a strong media and civil society. Why, then, should we be concerned about the implications of a Prabowo presidency for Indonesian democracy?

The obvious reason is Prabowo’s authoritarian past and his personal record of responsibility for human rights violations. Much of the criticism from Indonesian civil society groups has focused on this aspect, and Prabowo became angry in last week’s televised debate when Jokowi’s running mate, Jusuf Kalla, tried to goad him on the issue.

Another source of concern is the hints at explicitly anti-democratic elements in Prabowo’s program. He has repeatedly stated, for instance, that he wants to return Indonesia to the “original” 1945 Constitution, as it was signed in 18 August 1945. In other words, he wants to return to a version of the Constitution that places concentrated power in the hands of the president and removes virtually all the key democratic procedures and controls found in contemporary Indonesian democracy, most of which have been introduced by a series of constitutional amendments since 1998.

Prabowo frequently drops hints, too, that democracy itself, or at least the version that is practised in Indonesia, is a chief source of corruption and various other ills. In last week’s televised debate he talked about “destructive” democracy and stated he wanted to create a “constructive” democracy instead. He told one gathering of retired military officers last month that democracy “exhausts us.”

The real danger, however, lies in the combination of Prabowo’s emphasis on the leadership principle and what we know about his personality. It’s clear that he views himself as embodying the solution to Indonesia’s many problems and believes that imposing his will is the key to achieving national renaissance. At the same time, his public statements invoke unnamed enemies, and contain implied threats against them or others. (Confronted by journalists, for example, he often doesn’t answer their questions but instead asks what outlet they represent, as if he is compiling a private list of those who treat him disrespectfully.) Add to this already combustible mixture his propensity for flying into violent rages when he does not get his way, and we have every reason to predict that Prabowo could be a president who would be unusually impatient with democratic procedures, and punitive towards political foes.

The first year or two of a Prabowo presidency might go smoothly enough. But after a while, once he started to run into the normal frustrations and compromises that come with democratic life – when he hits a roadblock erected by the parliament, the Constitutional Court, the media, or some other checking institution – it’s all too easy to imagine a President Prabowo invoking emergency powers or using some other extraordinary method to sweep such obstacles aside. Already there have been reports of active military officers campaigning for him, and it would be relatively simple for him as president to reactivate the army’s “territorial structure” and bring the security forces back into politics.

Of course, a Prabowo government would not be a carbon copy of Suharto’s New Order; Indonesia has changed a great deal since those days and there would be much resistance to any authoritarian reversal. But one important global trend over the last couple of decades has been the emergence of what are sometimes known as electoral authoritarian regimes: systems where elections persist but civil liberties and democratic participation are manipulated to allow the ruling group to entrench itself. Think of a place like Putin’s Russia, and we might have a picture of what Prabowo’s Indonesia will eventually look like.

How did this happen?

Of course, it’s not unusual for there to be nostalgia for the authoritarian past, or even a full-fledged authoritarian reversal, a decade or so after a country makes a transition to democracy. Political scientists have for years been speculating that Indonesia was ripe for the emergence of a populist challenger to the existing system. Even so, many analysts of contemporary Indonesian politics – me included – have in recent times adopted a positive take on Indonesia’s democratic achievements. Many things seemed to be going right: the media is robust, civil society is strong, and attempts to wind back democratic space have almost always been defeated by public resistance. Indonesian democracy seemed to be consolidating.

At the same time, deep problems have long been visible and have been the topic of extensive scholarly analysis. Now, some of these problems may be coming home to roost. Even if he doesn’t win in July, the fact that Prabowo is within arm’s reach of the presidency should warn us that Indonesian democracy is more fragile than many of us were prepared to concede. Shortcomings in three areas seem especially important for explaining Prabowo’s rise.

First is “transitional justice” – the task of investigating and punishing officials responsible for past human rights abuses. Indonesia’s failure on this score has been all but total. After Suharto fell, there were numerous investigations and even some trials, but in the end no senior military officer or other official was found guilty and punished for any of the well-documented human rights abuses that occurred under the New Order. Indeed, one might say that the price the army extracted for getting out of politics was an informal guarantee that none of its leaders would be punished for past misdeeds. The fact that someone like Prabowo, who a decade and a half ago was so discredited that he had to leave the country, is now able to launch a strong presidential bid is testimony to the consequences of this failing.

Some of those who are now Prabowo’s opponents have themselves to blame for this situation: in 2009 Megawati Sukarnoputri chose Prabowo as her vice-presidential candidate, making it clear that for her and her party, a poor human rights record was politically inconsequential. This year, Prabowo’s supporters ask, with some justification, if Jokowi’s party didn’t worry about Prabowo’s human rights record back then, why should it be making an issue of it now?

Second is the breadth and the depth of political corruption. For years now, on almost any day you can open the pages of any major Indonesian newspaper and be assaulted by stories of corruption in haj funds, beef import scandals, land scams, oil smuggling, medical equipment scams, textbook scams, mark-ups in the building of hospitals or sports stadiums – you name it. Those involved include everyone from the highest ministers in the land down to the lowliest town councillors and civil servants. To be sure, much of the media exposure is itself a sign of progress in the fight against graft. Even so, Indonesians would be forgiven for believing that democracy has produced a political system in which virtually everything and everyone is indeed for sale, as Prabowo has repeatedly been saying.

The April legislative elections, which were accompanied by a veritable orgy of vote-buying and electoral manipulation, themselves form an important part of the backdrop to Prabowo’s rise in the polls. No wonder so many Indonesians – especially poor ones – take delight in Prabowo’s denunciations of the political elite and his promises to eradicate corruption through strong leadership, despite his own entanglement in New Order business and patronage networks.

Third, and closely related, is the transactional style of politics that has become central to Indonesia’s democracy. More so than in many countries, official politics in Indonesia has been characterised by what American political scientist Dan Slater calls “promiscuous power sharing”: the propensity of parties with widely differing ideological outlooks or social bases to put aside their differences for the sake of shared access to the patronage resources offered by government. In Indonesian politics, it often seems as if no political alliance is principled or based on policy affinity; instead, everything is up for negotiation and ripe for a deal. Most of the cabinets formed by post-Suharto presidents have thus been broad “rainbow coalitions” in which virtually every major party is represented. This system has itself helped to generate the public disillusionment on which the Prabowo challenge feeds, but it has also helped Prabowo build his political coalition. As well as his own Gerindra, four other major parties have fallen in behind his presidential bid: Golkar, PAN, PKS and PPP (the final three are all Islamic-based). There is an authoritarian strain in each of these parties, but one would think that at least some of their leaders would be reluctant to support a leader who threatens a revival of New Order–style politics, partly because some of their leaders (especially those of PAN and PKS) were themselves directly involved in the movement to topple Suharto.

More to the point, Prabowo might ultimately threaten the democratic system that has benefited these parties so much. He has successfully wooed them, of course, by offering ministries and other positions of power. (Bakrie for instance, boasted that Prabowo had offered him the previously unheard-of post of “chief minister.”) In short, Prabowo has built his coalition by engaging in the very horse-trading and deal-making that he condemns. In contrast, Jokowi refused to cut such deals with potential coalition partners, losing out on support from PAN and Golkar.

This is just one of the deep ironies – some would say, hypocrisies – of the Prabowo challenge. Prabowo has managed to mobilise a large coalition that includes many political forces that have benefited greatly from democratic reform and from the climate of deal-making and corruption that he himself so vigorously denounces. For example, a close look at Gerindra party candidates and campaigners in the regions quickly reveals that most of them are not at all hard-edged populists or ideologues committed to Prabowo’s professed vision of a strong and clean Indonesia. For most, Gerindra is just the latest stopping point in long political careers that have led them through other parties, and they are just as well-versed in the techniques of “money politics” as other politicians. (In one Central Java electoral constituency where I conducted research earlier this year it was the local Gerindra candidates who engaged most massively in vote-buying.) If Prabowo is a modern version of the Fuehrer or Il Duce – as some of the memes circulating on social media among Indonesian liberals only half-jokingly assert – he is one who is coming to power without the strongly ideological political party that carried along those earlier demagogues.

This is a major contradiction at the heart of the Prabowo challenge. His campaign is stridently populist, anti-system and anti-elite in its oratorical style. But it is a campaign that has emerged from the very heart of that system and its elite. That contradiction is currently his Achilles’ heel. When he condemns the “political elite” at election rallies, lined up behind him on the stage are party leaders who themselves personify that elite – including some of its most unpopular representatives, such as Golkar’s Aburizal Bakrie. When Prabowo condemns corruption, politically informed Indonesians know that many of the parties and party leaders who now back him are themselves deeply implicated in some of Indonesia’s most notorious corruption cases. In last week’s TV debate, Prabowo said the Indonesian economy had been “wrongly managed”: standing next to him as his running mate was Hatta Rajasa, President Yudhoyono’s coordinating minister for economic affairs. Jokowi’s supporters have been quick to seize on such contradictions, distributing through social media witty postings and images satirising Prabowo and his new alliances.

It is thus far from clear that Prabowo will win. For every voter who finds Prabowo’s angry rhetoric and his promise of strength appealing, there is still at least one more who prefers Jokowi’s low-key affability. Even so, the race is open, and it is momentous. Phrases like “turning point” get overused in discussions of politics. In Indonesia in 2014, the term is apt. Whatever choice Indonesian voters make, it will be highly consequential. A Jokowi victory will likely allow for continued slow consolidation of Indonesia’s developing democratic system, and it might in fact lead to significant improvement in the quality of the democratic institutions. A victory by Prabowo carries major risks of serious authoritarian regression. The outside world should be worried by this prospect, but the biggest losers will be Indonesia’s own people. •

In two places in the above article I suggest that Prabowo’s appeal is likely to be strongest among the poor. Since writing the piece, polling has become available that suggests that it is fact more urban, educated and wealthier Indonesians – in other words, the middle classes – who have shifted earliest and most strongly toward Prabowo. This fact points us toward a reopening of the scholarly debate that occurred in the late New Order regarding the conservative and authoritarian tendencies in Indonesia’s middle classes. — Ed Aspinall, 25 June 2014

Edward Aspinall is an Australian Research Council Future Fellow and researches Indonesian politics at the Australian National University.

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